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In a comment, Xu, Curty, Qi, Qian, and Lo claimed that discrete-variable (DV) measurement
device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) would compete with its continuous-
variable (CV) counterpart at metropolitan distances. Actually, Xu et al.’s analysis supports exactly
the opposite by showing that the experimental rate of our CV protocol (achieved with practical
room-temperature devices) remains one order of magnitude higher than their purely-numerical and
over-optimistic extrapolation for qubits, based on nearly-ideal parameters and cryogenic detectors
(unsuitable solutions for a realistic metropolitan network, which is expected to run on cheap room-
temperature devices, potentially even mobile). The experimental rate of our protocol (expressed as
bits per relay use) is confirmed to be two-three orders of magnitude higher than the rate of any
realistic simulation of practical DV-MDI-QKD over short-medium distances. Of course this does
not mean that DV-MDI-QKD networks should not be investigated or built, but increasing their rate
is a non-trivial practical problem clearly beyond the analysis of Xu et al. Finally, in order to clarify
the facts, we also refute a series of incorrect arguments against CV-MDI-QKD and, more generally,
CV-QKD, which were made by Xu et al. with the goal of supporting their thesis.
In a recent comment [1], Xu et al. claimed that discrete
variable (DV) measurement device independent (MDI)
quantum key distribution (QKD) [2–4] was unfairly com-
pared to a novel high-rate continuous variable (CV) pro-
tocol [5]. Here we show that this claim is false and we
fully clarify this DV-CV comparison. However, before
going into the details of this comparison, we need to rec-
tify a series of incorrect and misleading statements made
by these authors against CV-MDI-QKD and, more gen-
erally CV-QKD, with the aim of supporting their thesis.
Features of CV-MDI-QKD
First of all, contrary to the claims of Xu et al. [1],
the CV experiment of [5] is performed with cheap room-
temperature components (optical modulators and homo-
dyne detectors) in a regime of parameters which are eas-
ily achievable in practice. Modulations of ϕ ≃ 60 shot
noise units are relatively low with respect to what is
achievable (100 and more). Reconciliation efficiencies of
ξ ≃ 97% are currently state-of-the-art in CV-QKD exper-
iments [14–16]. An experimental excess noise ε ≃ 0.01
is not low but typical, fully comparable with the values
reported in the fibre-optic experiment of [17], where the
experimental excess noise was estimated to be ε ≃ 0.001
at 108 data points and ε ≃ 0.008 at 106 data points, for
Bob’s detection at 53 km. At lower distances. 25 km (as
is in our case), the excess noise is expected to be smaller,
which means that our experimental value ε ≃ 0.01 can
even be considered relatively high. The robustness of
CV-MDI-QKD against excess noise can also be appreci-
ated from the analysis done in the Supplementary Section
IE6 of [5] (in particular, see Fig. 5 there), where the se-
curity thresholds are proven to be robust against much
higher excess noise (ε = 0.1).
Then, Xu et al.[1] completely missed an important ad-
vantage of CV-MDI-QKD, which is the extremely good
performance of CV detection performed at the relay.
This crucial feature relies on two basic facts:
(1) The detection setup of CV-MDI-QKD is completely
different from that of one-way CV-QKD protocols.
(2) CV Bell detection is deterministic and highly effi-
cient (also in telecom setups).
Let us explain these points in detail and the reader may
also refer to the panels in Fig. 1.
In one-way (or point-to-point) CV-QKD protocols (see
Fig. 1a), Alice prepares outgoing quantum states while
Bob detects states incoming from the channel. Because
of this configuration, only the loss within Alice’s station
can be trusted and, therefore, neglected by re-scaling the
signal level at the output of Alice’s box. The loss within
Bob’s station cannot be re-scaled since it is added on top
of channel loss and noise (any re-scaling will also amplify
the loss and noise of the channel, without any signal-to-
noise advantage). For this reason, Bob’s overall quantum
efficiency is limited and this clearly affects fibre-optic
implementations at telecom wavelengths. For instance,
a quantum efficiency of 60% was reported in Ref. [17]
due to optical manipulations and photo-detection (how-
ever, note that this specific value of 60% can be improved
and, therefore, should not be considered as a fundamental
limit for the detection in one-way CV-QKD protocols).
By contrast, in the setup of CV-MDI-QKD depicted in
Fig. 1b, both Alice and Bob prepare outgoing quantum
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FIG. 1: Experimental loss in CV-QKD configurations (see text for more details). a, One-way CV-QKD protocol with limited
efficiency within Bob’s station, due to unscalable loss. b, Proof-of-principle demonstration of CV-MDI-QKD [5] in free-space
at optical/infrared regime (1064 nm) with ≃ 98% efficiency for the CV Bell detection. c, Proposal for a fibre-optic telecom
implementation of CV-MDI-QKD, where fibre-outcoupling and free-space CV Bell detection achieve ≃ 95% efficiency.
states in their private stations, where loss and noise are
trusted. For this reason, both the signal levels of Alice
and Bob can be set at the output of their stations, so
that the effect of the internal losses can be completely
neglected. Untrusted loss and noise will only affect the
channels and the detection at the relay. The latter has
extremely high efficiencies, indeed ηd ≃ 98% in our free-
space experiment at optical wavelengths (1064 nm).
Here it is worth remarking that the CV version of Bell
detection can be done deterministically with simple lin-
ear optics and photodetection [18], contrarily to the 25%
probability success affecting DV-MDI-QKD and the typ-
ical 50% value bounding teleportation experiments with
photonic qubits [18–21]. Most importantly, the quantum
efficiency of the homodyne detectors in CV Bell detec-
tions is extremely high. Contrary to the incorrect claims
of Xu et al. [1], homodyne detectors with high efficiencies
have been seen in both optical and telecom setups:
[Optical Setups] These include the various free-space
CV teleportation experiments [18], but also fibre-
based experiments, such as Ref. [8, 9], where cou-
pling efficiency to a fibre can be as high as 98−99%
and the quantum efficiency of photo-detectors can
be > 99%, with an overall efficiency of about
97− 98% [10].
[Telecom Setups] For instance, see Ref. [11], where the
performance of a balanced homodyne detection at
1550 nm is 98%, by means of InGaAs PIN diodes
with an active area of 500 µm in diameter and
a quantum efficiency of ∼ 99%, together with a
fringe visibility of 99.5% at the beamsplitter. See
also Ref. [12], where the overall efficiency of the
balanced homodyne detector at 1550 nm is 95%.
This is performed in free space at the output of a
10 m fibre, and the total 95% efficiency includes
both fibre in-coupling (the largest source of loss)
and outcoupling (estimated to be 0.1%) [13].
A simple fibre-optic implementation of CV-MDI-QKD
at telecom wavelengths can be done as shown in Fig. 1c.
Here the loss within Alice’s and Bob’s stations (e.g., as-
sociated with fibre connections and modulators) can all
be re-scaled as trusted loss. At the relay, the CV Bell
detection can be done in free space. The efficiency as-
sociated with fibre out-coupling is close to 100% if the
fibre facet is anti-reflection coated. The efficient of the
subsequent CV Bell detection is basically determined by
the homodyne detectors which may have 98% efficiency
at 1550 nm [11]. For instance, the CV Bell detection can
be done in the simplified setup of Ref. [5] involving a bal-
anced beam-splitter and two photodectors. Considering
0.2 dB insertion loss for the beam splitter and 99% effi-
ciency for the diodes [11], one realizes a CV Bell detection
with ≃ 95% efficiency. This means that the performance
of our proof-of-principle experiment can be achieved in
a future fibre-optic telecom implementation, contrary to
the conjectures made by Xu et al. [1] where the proto-
col was analysed by assuming too low efficiencies for the
detection at the relay (down to 85%).
Unfortunately, yet other claims made by Xu et al. [1]
were wrong. Contrarily to what they state:
(i) The asymptotic rate of [5] is not an upper
bound but a lower bound with respect to all possi-
ble attacks. In fact, the experimental rate is computed
from Alice and Bob’s shared classical data assuming the
whole environment belongs to Eve. Then, the theoretical
rate is derived against optimal attacks. More precisely,
this is minimized over all two-mode Gaussian attacks in
normal form after the application of the de Finetti theo-
rem and the extremality of Gaussian states [16]. This is
in contrast with the partial (and purely numerical) anal-
3yses in [22, 23] which only considered the simple case of
two independent entangling cloner attacks, as thoroughly
discussed in Ref. [24]. More details may be found in [25].
(ii) Finite-size effects against coherent at-
tacks [14–16] and composable security in the pres-
ence of collective attacks [26] support our results.
It is true that our theoretical rate is derived in the asymp-
totic limit of infinite signals but there is no evidence
that it would be sensibly affected by finite-size analy-
ses. In fact, the current finite-size analyses tend to the
asymptotic limit for blocks of & 108 data points (e.g.,
see Fig. 1 of [26]), which is the size considered in our ex-
periment [5]. This is also the size of data blocks consid-
ered in the experiment of Ref. [17], where the finite-size
key rate is shown to well-approximate the asymptotic
regime, especially below 30 km, as is clear from Fig. 2
of [17]. Note that (point-to-point) coherent-state proto-
cols are composable-secure against general coherent at-
tacks, but the present proof techniques are not sufficient
to prove fast convergence [27, 28]. The fact that a proof
is currently missing does not mean that such convergence
cannot be shown with another method, i.e., there is no
fundamental reason to conjecture that the composable-
secure key rates of coherent-based CV-QKD protocols
should not fastly converge to the asymptotic values. In-
deed this fast convergence has been already proven in
the most general case for squeezed-state CV-QKD [28].
By contrast, we note that finite-size analysis seems to
be very demanding for DV-MDI-QKD, where blocks of
& 1010 data points are needed for achieving reasonably
non-zero rates with practical detectors (see Fig. 4 of [29]).
(iii) The relay doesn’t need to be in Alice’s lab. In
fact, all configurations (symmetric or asymmetric) show
a non-trivial advantage with respect to DV-MDI-QKD at
metropolitan distances (5− 25km).
(iv) The use of a single local oscillator is not a
major security flaw in CV-QKD and its removal
is no longer an experimental challenge. The use of
a single local oscillator is typical in all CV-QKD imple-
mentations so far. Practical security against its potential
manipulation can be achieved if one implements an ac-
curate real-time measurement of the experimental shot
noise [28, 30]. Furthermore, CV-QKD can also be imple-
mented using two independent local oscillators followed
by classical post-processing [31–33]. Thus, the “source
requirements” brought up by Xu et al. (Appendix D
of [1]) are easily overcome. Regarding this issue of us-
ing a single laser, it is important to remark that Xu
et al.’s comment [1] is not just against CV-MDI-QKD
but the entire field of CV-QKD. According to Xu et al.’s
‘criteria’, all CV-QKD protocols implemented so far, in-
cluding the first ground-breaking table-top experiment
of Ref. [34] and the long-distance experiment of Ref. [17]
wouldn’t be, as they put it, “properly designed QKD
demonstrations” for their use of a single local oscillator.
(v) Fast homodyne detectors exist plus CVs re-
main superior even on slower clocks. In the op-
tical range, homodyne detection can be done at GHz-
bandwidths [35], with 80MHz detectors being available
with efficiencies & 86% [36] and, more recently, 100MHz
detectors at 99% efficiency [37]. This is a technology
which has large room of development at telecom wave-
lengths, where a field implementation of CV-QKD has
been already achieved at 1MHz clock [17]. This scenario
has to be compared with the 75MHz clock rate imple-
mented in DV-MDI-QKD [38], while 1GHz has only been
used for point-to-point BB84, with detector efficiencies of
about 20% [39] (now increasable up to 55% [40]). Here it
is important to note that the difference, in terms of bits
per use, can be so large that CVs may achieve higher
rates than DVs while using much slower clocks. For in-
stance, in the case of point-to-point QKD, a 50MHz-clock
CV protocol is already sufficient to outperform a 1GHz-
clock protocol with DVs at metropolitan distances [15].
Since there are about three orders-of-magnitude in the
rate (bits per use) between practical CV-MDI-QKD and
practical DV-MDI-QKD, the CV protocol could run on
clocks which are three orders-of-magnitude slower and
still achieve the same performances of DVs. For this rea-
son, a fibre-based telecom implementation of CV-MDI-
QKD at 1 MHz is hard to beat by any practical imple-
mentation of DV-MDI-QKD (see below for a full clarifi-
cation of the word “practical” in this context).
Actual comparison between CVs and DVs
Having refuted the various incorrect claims and conjec-
tures made by Xu et al. regarding CVs, we now perfom
a detailed comparison between CVs and DVs, consider-
ing a realistic analysis of DV-MDI-QKD. We can easily
see that practical parameters and cheap components for
DVs are certainly not those stated in Xu et al.’s com-
ment [1] but those considered by four of these same au-
thors in an earlier paper on “practical aspects” of DV-
MDI-QKD [41]. Practical DV-MDI-QKD involves stan-
dard single-photon detectors with ηd ≃ 14.5% efficiency
and a Y0 ≃ 6×10
−6 dark count rate, together with typical
values of the intrinsic error rate ed ≃ 1.5% and error cor-
rection efficiency parameter fe = 1.16 [42]. This is state-
of-the-art for room-temperature (20◦C) or thermoelectri-
cally cooled (-50◦C) semiconductor (InGaAs) avalanche
photodiodes (APD) detectors [43, 44], typically operat-
ing at 10−30% efficiency but with increasing dark counts
(see Fig. 2 of [43]).
Assuming these realistic and practical parameters, one
can easily compute an estimate of the rate for DVs by
assuming infinite decoy states, neglecting finite-size ef-
fects and other errors such as time-jitter and mode mis-
match (see Appendix for details). From Fig. 2 we see how
the rate of the practical DV-MDI-QKD is below that of
the practical CV-MDI-QKD by 3−4 orders-of-magnitude
over metropolitan distances, from 6km in the symmetric
case up to 25km in the most asymmetric configuration.
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FIG. 2: Comparison between the rates (bits per relay use) of CV-MDI-QKD and DV-MDI-QKD versus total Alice-Bob distance
(in fibre-equivalent at 0.2dB/km) and assuming different configurations for the relay in the various panels a-d. a, relay in Alice’s
lab. From bottom to top we consider: (1) Rate of practical DV-MDI-QKD with standard semiconductor detectors (ηd ≃ 14.5%,
ed ≃ 1.5%, Y0 ≃ 6 × 10
−6, fe = 1.16). (2) Rate of the optimal realistic DV-MDI-QKD with the best semiconductor detectors
(ηd ≃ 55%, Y0 ≃ 5 × 10
−4). Lower bound of the gray band refers to typical error ed ≃ 1.5%, while the upper bound refers
to ed ≃ 0.1% (fe = 1.16 in all cases) (3) Rate of ideal DV-MDI-QKD with cryogenic 93%-efficiency SNSPDs (ηd ≃ 93%,
ed ≃ 0.1%, Y0 ≃ 10
−6, fe = 1.16). (4) Rate of practical CV-MDI-QKD with room-temperature cheap components (ηd ≃ 98%,
ε ≃ 0.01, ϕ ≃ 60, ξ = 97%); squares are experimental data. (5) Rate of CV-MDI-QKD with ideal reconciliation efficiency
(as before but ξ = 100%). (6) Secret-key capacity of the total channel between Alice and Bob, lowerbounded by [47, 48] and
upperbounded by [49]. b, as in a but with a 100m-fibre between Alice and the relay. c, as in a but with 1km-fibre between
Alice and the relay. d, symmetric case where Alice and Bob are equidistant (in simulated fibre) from the relay; no experimental
data for this specific configuration.
It is interesting to study the maximum rate that one
can achieve with DVs by using semiconductor detectors.
Since we are interested in short to medium distances and
high rates, the choice is for detectors with the highest effi-
ciency (despite their high dark counts). The best solution
appears to be the very recent InGaAs/InP APDs oper-
ated in optimized self-differencing mode at room temper-
ature by Toshiba [40]. These achieve ηd ≃ 55% efficiency
with background rates Y0 ≃ 5 × 10
−4 at 20◦C. Fixing
fe = 1.16 and considering ed in the range 0.1% − 1.5%
we can estimate the optimal performance of realistic DV-
MDI-QKD in the lower gray band shown in Fig. 2. As
we see from the figure, the optimal DV-MDI-QKD with
semiconductor detectors is very good but still between 2
and 3 orders of magnitude below the already experimen-
tally achieved CV rate over typical metropolitan ranges.
In their comment, Xu et al. [1] compared our practical
CV experiment with a purely-theoretical numerical ex-
trapolation for DVs, which is based on nearly-ideal pa-
rameters and devices. In particular, they consider an
extremely-low intrinsic error rate ed ≃ 0.1% [38] (which
would be very demanding to realise with real-time mod-
ulators in a scalable practical network) and the most
advanced superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tors (SNSPDs). These detectors operate below 2K with
ηd ≃ 93% efficiency and a Y0 ≃ 6 × 10
−6 background
rate [45]. It is interesting to note that two of the authors
of Xu et al. [1] seem to be aware of the limitations of the
applicability of these SNSPDs to a real practical scenario,
as they openly admitted in a previous publication:
“The main drawback of these novel SNSPDs,
however, is their operating temperature,
which is currently of the order of 0.1 K.”
[Lo, Curty & Tamaki, Nature Photon. 8, 595-604 (2014)]
It is evident that such an ideal and cryogenic version of
DV-MDI-QKD is too demanding for the realistic con-
5struction of a scalable network (more details may be
found in [46]). Remarkably, even considering these over-
optimistic parameters, our practical CV protocol is still
≃ 1 order-of-magnitude better than this ideal extrapola-
tion with DVs in all the configurations of Fig. 2.
Furthermore, one can easily verify that the DV rate
collapses down by another 1− 2 orders-of-magnitude by
employing more standard SNSPDs with ηd . 45% [38].
By contrast, slight improvements in the reconciliation ef-
ficiency of classical protocols of error correction and pri-
vacy amplifications may provide further non-trivial gains
for CVs. As we see in Fig. 2, the CV theoretical rates
with ideal reconciliation (ξ = 100%) is very close to the
secret-key capacity of the total Alice-Bob channel [5],
achievable by CV-QKD protocols.
That being said, our analysis here does not want
to discourage the implementation of DV-MDI-QKD at
metropolitan distances. While Xu et al.’s cryogenic
version of DV-MDI-QKD does not seem to be suit-
able for building a realistic and low-cost metropoli-
tan network, an implementation of DV-MDI-QKD with
room-temperature (or slightly-cooled) semiconductor-
based single-photon detectors is not only realistic but
appealing, and may be the basis of a secure quantum net-
work with intermediate rates. We therefore strongly en-
courage serious and careful research in this direction. It
would also be interesting to explore potential hybrid DV-
CV approaches, as it is now happening for other quantum
protocols (e.g., see quantum teleportation [18]).
In conclusion, our take-home message is the following:
DV-MDI-QKD is very good for long distances [38, 50, 51],
but its rate struggles to be increased at various dis-
tances, thus motivating the proposal of alternate strate-
gies by the community [52]. By contrast, CV-MDI-
QKD [5, 24] struggles with long distances but can po-
tentially provide much higher rates at the metropolitan
range (5 − 25km), extending what happens for point-to-
point CV-QKD [15, 57]. This statement must not come
as a surprise since CV systems are fragile to loss (lim-
iting distance) but they can encode a lot of information
thanks to their theoretically infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space [16]. Furthermore, besides the use of cheap and
practical devices, CVs can easily go broadband.
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Appendix A: Secret-key rates
1. Secret-key rate of DV-MDI-QKD
An estimate for the secret key rate of polarisation-
encoding DV-MDI-QKD can easily be computed by as-
suming infinite decoy states and signals (i.e., ignoring
finite-size effects and composability) and neglecting a
series of technical errors, such as time-jitter, spectral
mismatch, pulse-shape mismatch and fluctuations of the
source intensities. This is effectively an upper bound
to the actual performance of DV-MDI-QKD and corre-
sponds to the quantity computed by [1], following [3, 41].
This (over-estimated) secret-key rate is given by
RDV-MDI = P
11
Z Y
11
Z
[
1−H2(e
11
X )
]
−QZ fe H2(EZ),
where P 11Z = µAµB exp[−(µA + µB)] is the probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob emit a single photon, with µA
7(µB) being the intensity of Alice’s (Bob’s) signal; Y
11
Z
is the yield in the Z-basis and e11X is the error rate
in the X-basis, assuming that the parties send single-
photon states; QZ and EZ are, respectively, the gain
and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the Z ba-
sis; fe is the error correction inefficiency, and H2(x) =
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon entropy.
Parameters Y 11Z , e
11
X , QZ and EZ , can be simulated
assuming a series of conditions, which further qualify the
result to be an upper bound of the actual rate. These
include the modeling of the intrinsic error ed by means of
two unitaries at the input of the beam splitter at the relay
station [41]. Considering single-photon detectors with
efficiency ηd and dark count rate Y0, one may write [1, 41]
Y 11Z = (1− Y0)
2
[
4Y 20 (1− ηAηd)(1 − ηBηd)
+2Y0
(
ηAηd + ηBηd −
3ηAηBη
2
d
2
)
+
ηAηBη
2
d
2
]
,
e11X =
1
2
−
(1 − Y0)
2(1− ed)
2ηAηBη
2
d
4Y 11X
,
where Y 11X = Y
11
Z , and ηA (ηB) is the transmissivity of
Alice’s (Bob’s) link with the relay. Then, one may write
QZ =
Ω1 +Ω2
2
, EZ =
Ω1
Ω1 +Ω2
,
where Ω1 and Ω2 are given in Eqs. (A4) and (A5) of [1].
Assuming various choices for the basic parameters ηd,
Y0 and ed, (with fe = 1.16 [42]), we maximize RDV-MDI
over the intensities µA and µB , deriving the simulated
theoretical rates shown in Fig. 2 of the main text.
2. Secret-key rate of CV-MDI-QKD
The security proof of CV-MDI-QKD needs a dedicated
discussion for infinite-dimensional systems which involves
various elements, including the “de Finettization” of the
classical data and the extremality of Gaussian states
(see [5] for details). From Alice’s amplitudes α, Bob’s
amplitudes β and the relay outcomes γ, we can derive
a joint classical probability p(α, β, γ) which identifies a
conditional “post-relay” state ρab|γ shared by Alice and
Bob in the entanglement-based representation of the pro-
tocol. Such a state is then purified into an environment
E which is assumed to be fully controlled by Eve. From
ρab|γ , we can derive both Alice and Bob’s mutual infor-
mation IAB , and Eve’s Holevo information χE (e.g., on
Alice’s variable α). As a result, we may write the rate as
RCV-MDI = ξIAB − χE ,
where ξ is the reconciliation efficiency of the classical
codes for error correction and privacy amplification. This
is the general method adopted to compute our experi-
mental rate.
In order to derive the theoretical rate, we have to model
the most general Gaussian attack against the two chan-
nels, which is compatible with observed channel trans-
missivities, ηA and ηB. This is done by combining
the two lossy channels in the most general way. Since
these canonical forms [16] always admit a local (non-
Stinespring) dilation with a beam splitter and a ther-
mal mode [16], the two-mode Gaussian attack can be
represented by two beam splitters subject to a generally-
correlated two-mode Gaussian state for the environment.
By means of local displacements and symplectic trans-
formations, this state can be reduced to a zero-mean
Gaussian state whose covariance matrix is in normal form
V(ωA, ωB, g, g
′), where ωA (ωB) is the thermal noise af-
fecting Alice’s (Bob’s) link, and parameters g and g′ de-
scribe the correlations between Eve’s modes. In these
conditions, Alice and Bob’s mutual information can be
written as IAB = log2[(ϕ+1)χ
−1], where ϕ is the modu-
lation of the coherent states and χ is the equivalent noise,
decomposable as χ = χloss+ ε, with χloss being the pure-
loss noise and ε(ηA, ηB, ωA, ωB, g, g
′) the ‘excess noise’.
For any fixed value of the transmissivities and excess
noise, we then optimize Eve’s Holevo information over
the remaining degrees of freedom, i.e., ωA, ωB, g and g
′.
Thus, we compute a lower bound of the rate, denoted
by Rϕ,ξ(ηA, ηB, ε) [5]. This quantity is asymmetric and
decreases more rapidly in ηA than in ηB. For this reason,
we obtain a further lower bound if we replace ηA → ηAηd,
where ηd takes into account of the overall efficiency of the
CV Bell detection at the relay. This quantity is here used
to compute the theoretical rates shown in the main text.
Note that a simple analytical formula can be written
in the case of ideal reconciliation ξ = 1 and large modu-
lation ϕ≫ 1. In this case, we have [5]
R(ηA, ηB , ε) = log2
[
2(ηA+ηB)
e|ηA−ηB |χ
]
+
h
[
ηAχ
ηA+ηB
− 1
]
− h
[
ηAηBχ−(ηA+ηB)
2
|ηA−ηB |(ηA+ηB)
]
,
where χ = 2(ηA + ηB)/ηAηB + ε and
h(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
−
x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
.
In the symmetric case ηA = ηB := η, this rate becomes
R(χ) = h
(χ
2
− 1
)
+ log2
[
16
e2χ(χ− 4)
]
.
3. Secret-key capacity
The total transmissivity of an equivalent point-to-
point lossy channel between Alice and Bob is equal to
ηtot = ηAηB . The maximum secret-key rate which is
achievable by a CV-QKD protocol is the secret-key ca-
pacity K of the channel, satisfying [47–49]
log2
(
1
1− ηtot
)
≤ K ≤ log2
(
1 + ηtot
1− ηtot
)
.
8Appendix B: Reply to the “Appendix E:
Addendum” of Xu et al.
Here we provide an additional reply to Xu et al. who
added an appendix to their comment (see the second
version available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.04819v2).
Most of the new comments are just repetitions of the old
arguments and have been already replied to in our text
above. However, we provide here, and again, a point-to-
point rebuttal of these issues, also claryfing other new
incorrect statements made by these authors. We apolo-
gize with the reader for the repetitions triggered by this
process. It is clear that Xu et al. are trying to make
all their possible arguments against CV-QKD once they
realised they were not able to approach the rate of CV-
MDI-QKD.
1 Xu et al. claim: “Pirandola et al. agree with our main
point.”
1 Our reply: No, we do NOT agree with their
main point, and we are NOT contradicting
our Nature Photonics paper [5]. Xu et al.
are clearly mis-quoting us. As already explained
before, the rate of CV-MDI-QKD with practical
devices and parameters is at least three orders-
of-magnitude higher than that of DV-MDI-QKD
with corresponding practical devices and parame-
ters [41]. The CV-rate also keeps an advantage of
between two and three orders-of-magnitude with
respect to the optimal realistic implementation of
DV-MDI-QKD with the best available semicon-
ductor single-photon detectors. This advantage is
quantified in terms of bits per relay use and evalu-
ated for various values (in dBs) of the channel loss.
That being said, the theoretical possibility of using
DV-MDI-QKD with cryogenic devices (SNSPDs)
currently seems: Unnecessarily complex and very
expensive; hard to miniaturise; not extendable to
more complex networks (e.g., where each node may
act as a user or as a relay); not extendable to
mobile devices (which can be hot-spots as well);
very fragile with respect to the performances of
the SNSPDs, easily losing one-two orders of mag-
nitude from > 90% to < 40% efficiencies. Most im-
portantly, better performances could be achieved
with practical implementations of CV-MDI-QKD
with cheap and room-temperature devices. Unfor-
tunately, Xu et al. keeps comparing our practical
experimental data with the theoretical simulation
of a potential cryogenic implementation.
2 Xu et al. claim: “Experimental results of CV-MDI-
QKD done in free-space, at a non-telecom wave-
length, and using nontelecom detectors cannot and
should not be used as a demonstration of tele-
com CV-MDI-QKD performance.” Plus other re-
dundant statements about the use of a single laser
etc.
2 Our reply: Despite the fact that ours is a proof-
of-principle experiment in free space at 1064 nm,
it gives a clear indication of the potential perfor-
mances of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol in a fibre-
based telecom-wavelength implementation, where
highly efficient homodyne detectors are available at
1550 nm and fibre-couplings are not an issue. This
is already fully explained in the main text. In par-
ticular, see our points (1) and (2) in the main text,
their explanations and Fig. 1. The use of a sin-
gle laser is not a major issue as already extensively
explained in point (iv) of the main text. There-
fore, our experimental results can be used to
make quantitative statements about the fu-
ture performance of a field implementation
of CV-MDI-QKD.
3 Xu et al. claim: “CV-MDI-QKD could have an
advantage over DV-MDI-QKD only under rather
restrictive conditions. We do not deny that
CV-MDI-QKD might have an advantage over
DV-MDI-QKD, but only in a rather restrictive
parameter space where a combination of as-
sumptions/conditions are simultaneously satisfied,
namely, (a) asymptotic key rate for an infinitely
long key, (b) high-efficiency (well above 85%) ho-
modyne detectors, (c) highly asymmetric configura-
tion where the relay is close to one of the two users,
Alice or Bob, (d) low loss (i.e., short distance).”
3 Our reply: This is another claim by these authors
which is very easy to disprove. The various points
have been already replied to before but, in any case,
we can again stress the reasons here.
(a) As already explained in point (ii) of the main
text, finite-size effects support our experimental re-
sults in the sense that these analyses tend to the
asymptotic limit for blocks of & 108 data points,
which is the size considered in our experiment [5].
Despite the fact that the theoretical rate is asymp-
totic, there is no reason to believe that it would be
sensibly affected by finite-size analyses. Here the
main argument of Xu et al. is that composability
security for coherent-state protocols against coher-
ent attack has not yet proven to converge quickly to
the asymptotic analysis. This is mainly a problem
of finding the correct proof technique, it cannot be
conjectured as a fundamental problem with CVs.
As a matter of fact, this problem does not even ex-
ist for squeezed-state protocols [28]. By contrast, it
is known that larger data blocks (& 1010 points)
are needed for DV-MDI-QKD with practical room-
temperature detectors.
(b) Homodyne detectors have high efficiencies (well
above 85%) both at optical and telecom wave-
lengths, free-space or coupled to fibre. This is typ-
ical and already explained above. For instance see
9the bullet points on page 2 of the main text. The
value of 85% of Xu et al. is unreasonably too low.
(c) As already stated in point (iii) of the main text
and completely clear from Fig. 2, the CV proto-
col can be run both in symmetric and asymmetric
configurations with superior performances.
(d) Typical distances are within the metropolitan
range. For instance, see again Fig. 2 where they
range between 6 and 25 km.
4 Xu et al. claim: “For CV-QKD with coherent states,
practical composable secure key rates against the
most general type of attacks have yet to be shown
[...] In this respect, Pirandola et al. [23] confuse
the restricted class of collective attacks with the
most general class of coherent attacks [...] current
security proofs against the most general type of co-
herent attacks for CV-QKD with coherent states
deliver basically zero key rate for any reasonable
amount of signals”
4 Our reply: This has been already replied to above.
Not having a proof of fast convergence is
one thing, proving that there is no fast con-
vergence is another. Xu et al. are either con-
fused by this point, or they are trying to make
a biased use of this argument. According to
Xu et al, all the coherent-state protocols
implemented so far, including the ground-
breaking results achieved in point-to-point
CV-QKD [17, 34], would then run the risk of
delivering zero key rate in the composability
security framework. This implication seems to
be rather absurd, also considering the fact that, for
squeezed-state protocols, fast convergence has al-
ready been proven. And, yes...luckily we know the
difference between collective and coherent attacks
(among other things, some of our co-authors have
defined the most general form of collective Gaus-
sian attack against CV-QKD protocols [58]).
5 Xu et al. claim: “The critical dependence of CV-
MDI-QKD key rates on homodyne detection effi-
ciency is down played by Pirandola et al.”
5 Our reply: No. This is just a repetition, already
replied to in (b) of point 3 above.
6 Xu et al. claim: “Pirandola et al.’s free-space exper-
iment is not a properly designed QKD demonstra-
tion, thus the results shown in Fig. 1 are all purely-
numerical”. Their reasons would be (a) “The use
of a single laser”; (b) “Table-top experiment at a
wavelength outside the telecom band” and (c) “In-
correct noise model” (i.e., low excess noise).
6 Our reply: No. This is another repetition.
Our proof-of-principle experiment is a properly-
designed free-space QKD experiment, which pro-
vides clear indications of the full potentialities of
the protocol in a future field implementation with
fibre connections at telecom wavelengths, as al-
ready discussed in point 2 above. In particular:
(a) About the single laser: As already explained
before, the malicious manipulation of the local
oscillator can be overcome with practical exper-
imental techniques [28, 30]. Note that all CV-
QKD protocols have been implemented with a
common local oscillator, as is our CV-MDI-QKD
protocol. Therefore, Xu et al. would au-
tomatically claim that all CV-QKD proto-
cols would not be “properly designed QKD
demonstrations”.
(b) About the table-top experiment: Again, this is
already replied to in point 2 above.
(c) About the noise model: As already explained
in the main text, our experimental excess noise
ε ≃ 0.01 is not low but typical, fully comparable
with the values reported in the fibre-optic experi-
ment of [17], where the experimental excess noise
was estimated to be ε ≃ 0.001 at 108 data points
and ε ≃ 0.008 at 106 data points, for Bob’s detec-
tion at 53 km. At lower distances . 25 km (as is
in our case), the excess noise can actually go below
these values, which means that our experimental
value ε ≃ 0.01 can even be considered relatively
high. The robustness of CV-MDI-QKD against ex-
cess noise can also be appreciated from the anal-
ysis done in the Supplementary Section IE6 of [5]
(in particular, see Fig. 5 there), where the security
thresholds are proven to be robust against much
higher excess noise (ε = 0.1). Even assuming the
numbers given by Xu et al. (0.015), this is com-
pletely compatible with our experimental value.
7 Xu et al. claim: “CV-MDI-QKD could be suitable
only for particular network architectures” repeat-
ing some arguments on the sub-optimal perfor-
mance of the symmetric configuration.
7 Our reply: Xu et al. make several errors here:
(a) A real network is very unlikely to be perfectly
symmetric, but most of the nodes will be in an
asymmetric configuration.
(b) The model of star network they consider is very
restrictive. This model is necessary if the relay
needs to be implemented with very expensive cryo-
genic detectors (as those suggested by these authors
for DV-MDI-QKD). By contrast, CV-MDI-QKD
would allow one to use cheap detectors for the re-
lay, which means that every node in the network
can play a role as a user or as a relay, depending
on the situation. In this more flexible scenario, Al-
ice just needs to connect to the closest (untrusted)
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node available to secretly communicate with a re-
mote (authenticated) Bob.
(c) Finally, even assuming the symmetric config-
uration, Alice and Bob can be separated by a 6
km-long fibre, which is not exactly a short distance
at the metropolitan scale.
At the end of their “Addendum” Xu et al. make some
“Final remarks”. Some of these are completely secondary
issues, others are just repetitions of previous points which
have been already addressed or refuted, especially the re-
iterated points on the finite-size effects, the use of a single
laser, and the homodyne detectors. We note that Xu et
al. misunderstood in which sense our theoretical rate
is “optimal”, thinking that it would be a sort of upper
bound. The optimality is clearly intended as a minimiza-
tion over all possible attacks which therefore qualifies the
key rate as a lower bound – see point (i) of the main text
for full details. Thus, what Xu et al. say (“We admit that
it was unclear to us whether or not the realistic Gaussian
attack considered in [1] to derive the theoretical rate was
indeed optimal, or if it provided an upper bound on the
theoretical rate. So, in our simulations we opted for the
most favourable case for CV-MDI-QKD by considering
that the attack is optimal....We are glad to see that Pi-
randola et al. [23] confirm this.”) is not confirmed by us
and it is clearly wrong.
